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FROM APPENDIX TO HEART: TRACING
THE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE
BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS.
Gerard N. Magliocca.1 New York: Oxford University Press,
2018. Pp. xii + 235. $29.95 (Hardcover).
Lael Weinberger2
I. INTRODUCTION: THE THINGS
WE TAKE FOR GRANTED
The upper level of the National Archives museum features
three documents, grandly presented in a marble rotunda: the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of
Rights. When the hall is open for visitors, the documents are
displayed behind bulletproof glass and constantly attended by
guards; at night, the documents are stored still more securely in a
bomb-proof vault.3 “In this Rotunda are the most cherished
material possessions of a great and good nation,” President
George W. Bush said in 2003 at an event reopening the hall after
a major renovation.4 Every branch of government was
represented at the event, offering encomiums to the documents
enshrined in the hall. Many commentators have observed that
these documents are a kind of American scripture, sacred texts
that every good citizen professes to honor.5
1. Samuel R. Rosen Professor at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
2. Raoul Berger-Mark DeWolfe Howe Legal History Fellow, Harvard Law School.
3. Hilary Parkinson, The Men and Women Who Guard the Constitution, NAT’L
ARCHIVES: PIECES OF HISTORY (March 29, 2016), https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/
2016/03/29/the-men-and-women-who-guard-the-constitution/; ATOMIC AUDIT: THE
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1940, 322 (Stephen I.
Schwartz ed., 1998).
4. The Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom Reopens at the National Archives,
PROLOGUE MAGAZINE, Winter 2003, Vol. 35, No. 4, https://www.archives.gov/
publications/prologue/2003/winter/rededication.html.
5. I borrow the language of “American scripture” from PAULINE MAIER,
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It was not always this way. In The Heart of the Constitution,
Gerard Magliocca explains that the Bill of Rights was not just
relegated to the status of afterthought for many years—it was in
fact not even recognized as a single, unified document for much
of its history. The Bill of Rights was not always known as “the Bill
of Rights.”
Magliocca has crafted a work of history about the idea of the
Bill of Rights. The book is less a history of the Bill of Rights as
law than it is the history of the Bill of Rights as concept and as
rhetoric. This is not a history of the ways that legally enforceable
provisions of the document were interpreted, applied, litigated, or
enforced. The focus is on how people’s ideas about a particular
set of amendments to the Constitution evolved to see them as a
single and iconic embodiment of American ideas and legal ideals.
This review highlights three of Magliocca’s key arguments
before concluding by considering the open questions that
Magliocca leaves. Part II considers his evaluation of the bill of
rights genre in the late eighteenth century. Part III turns to
Magliocca’s account of neglect—the long period in which the Bill
of Rights just didn’t appear in American discourse. Part IV
describes (and offers some qualifications to) his explanation for
increased interest in the Bill of Rights. Part V reflects on the limits
of Magliocca’s methodology.
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS GENRE
The first “bill of rights” to claim the name was the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, and this is where Magliocca starts his story.
The English Bill of Rights was a product of the Glorious
Revolution (1688), when Parliament deposed James II and
installed William of Orange on the throne. James had posed a
threat to the rights of Englishmen, said the theorists of the
revolution, and Parliament’s action had vindicated those rights.
Parliament, convened irregularly without a king, issued a
declaration of rights. After William took the throne, Parliament
AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997)
(describing the creation and constant reinterpretation of the Declaration of
Independence) and from Gordon Wood, Dusting Off the Declaration, THE N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Aug. 14, 1997 (reviewing Maier’s book and referencing the National Archives’
display as an example of the veneration of the document). Maier later extended the
observation to the Bill of Rights: Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights,
15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497 (2017).
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was properly assembled as such. It then put the rights into a bill
and enacted that through its normal process, creating the Bill of
Rights.
Magliocca argues that this established a template that would
influence another generation of “bills of rights” enacted by the
American colonists almost a century later, during their conflict
with crown and Parliament. Magliocca argues that the phrase “bill
of rights” was associated with a particular kind of document in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: a document with rhetorical
flair, introduced by a rousing preamble, issued either as a standalone declaration or at the start of a constitution. The Continental
Congress followed the example of the English when it drafted the
“Declaration of Rights and Grievances” in 1774. As the newlyindependent American colonies became states, several of them
drafted their own bills of rights. Virginia was the trendsetter.
Magliocca points out that the Virginia Declaration (1776) took
cues from the English Bill of Rights. Like the English version, the
Virginia Declaration was also issued as a stand-alone document
and was used to justify a revolution. He also argues that both
documents placed the enumeration of individual rights as
secondary to its more philosophical statements on the nature of
government. Shortly thereafter, the Declaration of Independence
itself drew on the example of the English Bill of Rights. Magliocca
argues that both documents had parallel emphases: they placed
blame for violations of the law and of the (unwritten) English
constitution and then enumerated those violations.
Magliocca makes two points about this history. The first is
that a bill of rights was a useful rhetorical tool used during times
of political unrest. His more surprising and provocative point is
that bills of rights were political and not legal documents. They
helped to explain and justify controversial decisions, such as
revolution. The enumeration of rights was not done with an eye
to legal enforcement. Their drafters did not seriously contemplate
these rights being invoked in court.
With this backdrop, Magliocca turns to the subject of this
book, the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution
that we now call the “Bill of Rights.” Magliocca situates this in a
crisp but conventional narration of the controversy over the
United States Constitution and the call for a “bill of rights.”6 But
6. The story has been told many times as part of the larger story of the debate over
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he has something new to offer when he gets to the actual
enactment of the Bill of Rights. Magliocca’s point is that, by the
time the first Congress began creating what we now think of as
the bill of rights, the project had stopped looking like a “bill of
rights”—that is, not what people at the time would have
recognized as a bill of rights. It wasn’t enacted as a freestanding
statement of rights. It was a set of individually-enacted
amendments to a legal document. The amendments could be
voted on and ratified one at a time, not as a single statement. (The
first two amendments proposed by Congress in 1789 were not
ratified by the states. The original second amendment would be
ratified two centuries later as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.)
It lacked the preamble that gave previous American bills of rights
thematic coherence. The amendments had a political function, to
be sure. But the form the set of amendments as a whole took was
different from prior bills of rights that explicitly justified major
government change. This bill of rights was part of a deal to handle
challenges to the Constitution’s legitimacy, but that’s not quite the
same as justifying the change directly, as previous bills of rights
did. In short, Magliocca has made a case that there was a
recognizable form for bills of rights in the late eighteenth
century—and that the “Bill of Rights” of 1789 didn’t fit the genre.
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS FORGOTTEN TEXT
The theme for the next hundred years of the Bill of Rights’
history is neglect. Many commentators have noted that individual
provisions of the Bill of Rights appeared only rarely in the
nineteenth century courts.7 This was partly a consequence of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Barron v. Baltimore,8 that the
limitations on government provided in the amendments bound
only the federal government, not the states. In Barron itself, the
Court described the amendments to the Constitution as just
that—“amendments,” not a bill of rights.9

ratification of the Constitution. The current benchmark source on the ratification debates
is PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788 (2011). The first academic monograph devoted to the Bill of Rights as a whole was
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1959).
7. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 290 (1998).
8. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
9. Id. at 250.
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On the scattered occasions when Magliocca finds Americans
using the phrase “bill of rights” in the nineteenth century, they
often aren’t even referring to the first ten amendments. In Barron,
for instance, Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion references the
Constitution’s Article One, Section Nine, as “in the nature of a
bill of rights.”10 Other cases cited the limitations on the states in
Article One, Section Ten, as a “bill of rights.”11 In broader public
discourse, newspapers, speeches, and pamphlets referred to the
Declaration of Independence as a national bill of rights.
Reconstruction marked an extraordinary exception to the
general neglect of the Bill of Rights. Representative John
Bingham, one of the key architects of the Fourteenth
Amendment, spoke loudly and often about the importance of
safeguarding the Bill of Rights against state infringement. A
substantial literature and jurisprudence has built up around the
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Bill of Rights (in whole or in part) against the states (and, if so,
what clause of the amendment actually accomplishes this result).12
Magliocca avoids this debate. His point is conceptually prior to
this debate: when Bingham and other Congressional Republicans

10. Id. at 248.
11. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810) (describing Article One, Section Ten, as
“what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state”); Piqua Branch of State
Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. 369, 392 (1853) (“It is, in the emphatic language of Chief
Justice Marshall, a bill of rights to the people of the States, incorporated into the
fundamental law of the Union.”).
12. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–43 (1963) (describing
incorporation via the Due Process Clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1964) (same);
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (applying the modern approach of selective
incorporation); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (same); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for total incorporation); id. at 59–68
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing against incorporation); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806–
13 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (arguing for incorporation via the Privileges or
Immunities Clause). If this isn’t enough, the scholarly literature offers still other options.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193 (1992) (arguing the Due Process Clause incorporates only those Bill of Rights
provisions that safeguard the rights of citizens); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014)
(claiming the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all enumerated rights in the Bill of
Rights and elsewhere); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (contending the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
enumerated and unenumerated rights alike); and CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE (2015) (arguing the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects the equality of similarly-situated citizens of the United States).
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started talking about the “Bill of Rights,” they were taking an
unusual step to give a name to this first group of amendments to
the Constitution. Democratic members of Congress who opposed
the Fourteenth Amendment did not adopt the name, “Bill of
Rights,” but persisted in referring to them as “‘limitations’” on
Congressional power or “‘clauses of the Constitution’” (p. 64).
And as the debate progressed, it became clear that even among
the Amendment’s supporters, there was disagreement about how
many of the Constitution’s amendments deserved the “Bill of
Rights” title. Some Congressional Republicans talked about the
first ten amendments but others talked about only the first eight—
excluding the Ninth Amendment’s reference to unenumerated
rights and the Tenth Amendment’s limitation of the federal
government to delegated powers. The confusion about what
exactly was meant when the term was used was just another
indication that the document which we take for granted now was
not thought of as a unified piece of the American heritage at the
time.
In any case, the era of enthusiasm for the “Bill of Rights”—
however many amendments that included—was brief. “Like most
of the lofty ideals of Reconstruction,” Magliocca writes,
“[Bingham’s] understanding of the first set of amendments fizzled
during the 1870s and 1880s.” (p. 66). The Supreme Court didn’t
adopt the term “Bill of Rights” in the aftermath of
Reconstruction. It referenced amendments to the Constitution,
collectively or individually. In a lecture in 1880, Justice Miller
insisted, “‘Our Constitution . . . does not contain any formal
declaration or bill of rights.’” (p. 67). New state constitutions
drafted by former Confederate states modeled their bills of rights
on the Virginia Declaration of Rights rather than the federal
Constitution’s first several amendments. The one exception was
that many of them included a state analogue to the federal
Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery—demonstrating,
Magliocca argues, that the “assumption . . . that only a
constitutional amendment proposed in 1789 can be part of the Bill
of Rights” was a still more modern invention. (p. 68). The
Reconstruction conception of the Bill of Rights was not gone
entirely. It made a brief but notable appearance in a dissent by
Justice John Marshall Harlan. The Supreme Court majority had
decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the Fifth
Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause or the Sixth Amendment’s Jury
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Trial Clause to the states—and it did so without describing the
rights as part of a bill of rights.13 Harlan argued for incorporation
of these limits on the states and described the first ten
amendments as “the national Bill of Rights” throughout his
opinion.14 It was a hint at what was to come.
IV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR
GOVERNMENT POWER
Up to this point, the book’s primary focus has been on
deconstructing the naïve idea that the Bill of Rights is a constant
in the American experience. To the contrary, Magliocca shows
that it was not even thought of as a single, unified document for a
substantial part of its own history. But when the book’s narrative
reaches the end of the nineteenth century, it takes a turn toward
a new, positive argument about how the Bill of Rights came to
prominence in American law and culture. According to
Magliocca, the Bill of Rights came to prominence when
Americans wanted to justify broader government powers.
In popular culture, the Bill of Rights is thought of primarily
as protecting individual rights and constraining the government.
But Magliocca argues that in practice it often worked in the
opposite manner. It’s not as though the Bill of Rights grants the
government additional power. Rather, Magliocca suggests that
the existence of the Bill of Rights diverted opposition and
assuaged fears that might otherwise arise about expansive
government power. Justice Robert Jackson made the point in his
famous opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette: “Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear
and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe to
live under it makes for its better support.”15
This pro-government-power function of the Bill of Rights
goes all the way back to the beginning, as Magliocca reminds
readers. In the debates over ratification of the Constitution, some
diehard antifederalists suggested that talk of adding a bill of rights
was a distraction from the real danger: the powerful federal
government that would be created by the new Constitution.
Eighteenth-century whalers would distract their quarry by tossing
13. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
14. Id. at 607 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943).
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a tub into the sea; antifederalists said that any bill of rights would
be nothing but a tub thrown to the whale.16 But the tub was tossed,
the Constitution amended, and what followed was roughly a
century of inaction for the “Bill of Rights.”
Magliocca argues that the surprising turning point for the Bill
of Rights was the introduction of formal American empire. In the
aftermath of the late nineteenth century, the United States
acquired overseas holdings that almost no one anticipated making
into states. (This at least helps distinguish this colonies from the
“domestic empire” that characterized so much prior American
expansion.)17 The largest population among these imperial
holdings was in the Philippines. Critics of empire argued that it
was hypocritical of the United States to proclaim its adherence to
liberty while governing territories captured and held without
traditional American protections for individual liberties. And
strikingly, these complaints increasingly invoked the “Bill of
Rights” as the paradigmatic example of the rights held by
Americans. President William McKinley answered the critics by
sending instructions to the Philippine Commission, led by William
Howard Taft as the interim government for the islands. The Bill
of Rights wouldn’t be applied entire, but the government did have
to respect a substantial subset of the federal Bill of Rights. This
became a debating point as the election cycle got underway in
1900. It also made its way into the Supreme Court.
The first case in which a Supreme Court majority called the
first set of amendments the “Bill of Rights” was Kepner v. United
States,18 one of the so-called “Insular Cases,” which considered
which federal constitutional provisions applied in the territories
acquired by the United States in the Spanish-American War.
(Magliocca notes that it is also unique in being the only case to
suggest that the first nine amendments to the Constitution
constituted the Bill of Rights.) Magliocca points out that there’s
still something strange going on: the Court used the “Bill of
16. See Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and
Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988).
17. On the various facets of empire in American history and historiography, see Paul
A. Kramer, Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,
116 AM. HIST. REV. 1348 (2011). For accessible treatments of empire in American history,
see WALTER NUGENT, HABITS OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN EXPANSION
(2008) and DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE
GREATER UNITED STATES (2019).
18. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
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Rights” terminology repeatedly in this opinion, but had not done
so in other cases decided shortly before Kepner, which involved
the question of incorporation against the states. Why the
difference? Magliocca suggests that it was another version of the
“tub to the whale” scenario: the Court was likely “supportive of
congressional power over the Philippines and wanted to shore up
the legitimacy of that authority by underscoring how it was used
to apply the Bill of Rights” (p. 83). By contrast, “in incorporation
cases the Court (save Justice Harlan) was not supportive and
wanted to delegitimize extending the first set of amendments to
the states” (p. 83).
In Magliocca’s telling, the next really big breakthrough for
the Bill of Rights taking its place in the conceptual maps of
Americans was the New Deal. The “master politician” and
communicator, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, invoked the Bill
of Rights repeatedly as he defended his New Deal policies against
detractors. Again, the main function of this rhetorical use of the
Bill of Rights was to “legitimate the growth of federal power” (p.
93). Critics of the New Deal said that the expansion of federal
regulation came at the expense of personal liberty. Roosevelt
responded that so long as the Bill of Rights was intact, liberty was
preserved. The Bill of Rights didn’t have to authorize New Deal
policies to nonetheless help validate them, when Roosevelt could
explain that he was acting within the scope of his lawful conduct.
Roosevelt becomes a key figure in Magliocca’s search for the
turning point, where the Bill of Rights goes from being merely a
set of disparate amendments to the Constitution to being a totem
of American freedom.
Magliocca notes that Roosevelt’s critics also picked up
references to the Bill of Rights. The Republican Party platform in
1936 cited the Bill of Rights when it proclaimed its devotion to “‘a
government of laws’,” as opposed to “‘the autocratic perils of a
government of men.’” (p. 94). This was an obvious jab at
Roosevelt, who was regularly accused by conservative critics of
being a potential authoritarian.
The Bill of Rights was back again during the debate over the
court-packing plan in 1937. Frustrated with the Supreme Court’s
repeated holdings that aspects of the New Deal exceeded
congressional authority, Roosevelt proposed adding new seats to
the Supreme Court, which of course he would get to fill. This time,
Roosevelt’s critics wielded the Bill of Rights to successfully
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oppose his plans: they argued that Roosevelt threatened judicial
independence and that this in turn weakened the protections
provided by the Bill of Rights.
The New Deal and its surrounding controversies propelled
the Bill of Rights toward the center of national conversation as
never before. But the final step toward securing their place was
World War II. Roosevelt’s “four freedoms” nodded to the Bill of
Rights when establishing the Allies’ wartime ideology of
defending freedom. For American audiences in particular,
Roosevelt frequently invoked the freedoms protected by the Bill
of Rights as among the most cherished American values at stake
in the war. Lose the war, and authoritarians would destroy these
safeguards.
At the same time, the Supreme Court too took up the banner
of the Bill of Rights. After abandoning the protection of freedom
of contract and expanding the commerce clause, the Supreme
Court fell back on the Bill of Rights as the final constraint on the
federal government. Magliocca writes that Justice Felix
Frankfurter was the first justice to make the Bill of Rights a
regular feature of the Court’s rhetoric, even though Frankfurter
himself was more skeptical than many of his colleagues about
aggressive judicial enforcement of individual rights claims.
Magliocca highlights the famous pair of rulings on whether
compulsory recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance in public
schools were constitutional—the Court first said yes in Gobitis,19
only to reverse itself in Barnette.20 Magliocca reads Barnette as a
wartime case, with allusions to the Nazi threat in the majority
opinion’s castigation of enforced conformity. It is also one of the
great paeans to the Bill of Rights in the Supreme Court’s history.
In it, Magliocca finds a bridge between the governmentempowering Bill of Rights that the book has highlighted up to this
point, and the libertarian Bill of Rights21 that Magliocca has used
as his foil. The Court’s majority opinion by Justice Jackson was
written with the New Deal in view—this is the case in which
Jackson explained that the Bill of Rights made possible a robust
government. But he also articulated the libertarian view of the
19. See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
20. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
21. “Libertarian” here is simply a useful shorthand for the cluster of attitudes that
often characterize contemporary treatment of the Bill of Rights—viewing the document
as a restraint on government power and a protection for personal liberty.
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Bill of Rights in powerful prose that has deeply influenced several
generations of lawyers and jurists: “The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts.”22
There’s reason to quibble with Magliocca’s emphasis at this
point. Both in the treatment of the New Deal in general and in his
treatment of the court packing controversy, he gives only cursory
coverage to Roosevelt’s opponents. Part of this may be a product
of Magliocca being less than precise in defining his argument
about government power. To the extent Magliocca is simply
intent on making the case that the Bill of Rights has functioned to
enable government power, it’s understandable that his coverage
of the other side is brief—his readers already know that the Bill
of Rights can function to criticize government power. But to the
extent Magliocca wants to make a stronger claim, that the Bill of
Rights was more often used to support enhanced government
power, or was more effective in this role, the point is weakened by
his failure to seriously engage with the opposition to the New
Deal. And to the extent Magliocca’s objective is to identify
turning points in the rhetoric around the Bill of Rights, it is
curious that there isn’t more attention devoted to the Bill of
Rights rhetoric wielded against Roosevelt.
A considerable body of scholarly work has argued that the
New Deal catalyzed a conservative critique along many fronts,
playing an important role in the origins of modern political and
legal conservatism.23 The Bill of Rights appeared repeatedly in the
22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
23. For sampling of this literature, and its internal debates over the importance of
the New Deal relative to other issues in the development of modern conservatism, consider
KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE
MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN (2009) (discussing the role of business
leaders in constructing modern conservatism); GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER, THE
CONSERVATIVE CENTURY: FROM REACTION TO REVOLUTION (2009) (discussing
conservatism’s transition into a democratic political movement); CONSERVATISM AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Brian J. Glenn & Steven M. Teles, eds. 2009)
(studying the influence of conservatism on domestic policy and how the growth of the
government has shaped conservatism); DAVID FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERN
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (2010) (starting the history of modern American
conservatism with the opposition to the New Deal); GORDON LLOYD & DAVID
DAVENPORT, THE NEW DEAL AND MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: A DEFINING
RIVALRY (2013) (focusing on the economic debates that have defined liberalism and
conservatism since the Great Depression); KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RIGHT OUT OF
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rhetoric of the opposition. A quick search through the New York
Times archive is illustrative. A Letter to the Editor in 1933
complained that a proposal to add a “child labor amendment” to
the Constitution (supported by Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins), permitting government regulation, would enable the
state to interfere with the liberties of families which otherwise
were shielded by the Bill of Rights.24 When Theodore Roosevelt,
Jr., son of the former president, took the helm of the National
Republican Club in 1934, he announced that the Republican
theme in the fall congressional election cycle would be a fight “for
personal liberty, for the Bill of Rights—a fight for the
spirit of America.”25 Former-president-turned-administrationcritic Herbert Hoover used the Bill of Rights as his main theme in
a major speech broadcast nationwide in 1935.26 A 1934 Letter to
the Editor took Roosevelt to task for disregarding the Bill of
Rights: “In some instances my rights have been violated. In others
Mr. Roosevelt has attempted, unsuccessfully, to take away from
the people some of the liberties guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights.”27 The list of examples could go on—and this is just from
one newspaper.
The presidential rhetoric about the Bill of Rights in the early
New Deal—which is highlighted in The Heart of the
Constitution—is actually quite reactionary. A Letter to the Editor
in the New York Times defended Roosevelt by referencing the
Bill of Rights, an echo of the president’s own rhetoric in
responding to these critics: the president “has not scrapped our
Bill of Rights and he has not suppressed our organs of public
expression.”28 That’s a defense answering a critique, not a strong
affirmative case for the New Deal program.
CALIFORNIA: THE 1930S AND THE BIG BUSINESS ROOTS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM
(2015) (arguing modern conservatism grew out of Californian agribusiness manipulating
fears of cultural change); KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW
CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN AMERICA (2016) (linking the rise of
religious references in conservative public discourse with backlash against the New Deal).
24. See J. Gresham Machen, Child Labor Amendment: It Is Regarded as Invasion of
the Liberty of American Family Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1933, at 18.
25. Col. Roosevelt Sets Fall “Issue”: He Asserts Fall Campaign Will Be Based on
“Defense of Bill of Rights,” N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1934, at 14.
26. See Hoover on Air Tomorrow: Will Speak on “Bill of Rights” at San Diego
Constitution Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1935, at 2.
27. Norman C. Norman, Finds Rights Gone Under the NRA: One Who Heard the
President Checked Up for Himself, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1934, at 18.
28. Leo M. Glassman, Not a Dictator: President Is Fulfilling a Trust by Constitutional
Means, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1933, at 12.

07 WEINBERGER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

BOOK REVIEWS

12/23/2019 10:24 AM

531

Shifting the emphasis to the critics suggests a possible
alternative framing. Magliocca emphasizes the employment of the
Bill of Rights in rhetoric defending robust government programs.
He’s right that it could and did have that function on occasion.
But in every example Magliocca offers, it’s very much in a
reactionary mode: someone asserts that the Bill of Rights ought
to restrict some exercise of governmental power, and the
proponent of power then finds a way to invoke the Bill of Rights
in defending that power. In 1787, the federalist supporters of the
Constitution were confronted by antifederalists insisting that a bill
of rights in some form spell out limits on the federal government;
the federalists eventually compromised and amended the
Constitution, using the amendments to legitimize the more
powerful national government (the “tub to the whale,” as cynical
antifederalists observed). A century later, critics of America’s
colonial government in the Philippines excoriated the denial of
constitutional rights by the United States; the President and
Supreme Court then invoked a partial application of the Bill of
Rights to shore up the legitimacy of American rule. And then with
the coming of the New Deal, critics alleged that the expansion of
federal power and activity would offend the Bill of Rights. Again,
the proponents of government power developed a counterstrategy for invoking the Bill of Rights. In this narrative, the Bill
of Rights emerges as a weapon in the arsenal of groups opposed
to expansive federal power—a weapon, but not a very effective
one, given the fluency of power proponents in finding answering
arguments.
In the New Deal period specifically, more attention to the
critics would help link the story that Magliocca tells with other
recent historical scholarship on the transformation of rights
litigation in the period. Specific rights within the Bill of Rights,
particularly free speech, got renewed attention as business leaders
realized that they could provide a legal basis for opposing the
regulatory apparatus of the expanding New Deal state, as works
by Laura Weinrib and Jeremy Kessler have demonstrated.29 They
found themselves in an unlikely alliance with labor activists, who
29. See LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL
LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016) (discussing the changing conception of civil liberties from
its radical roots to constitutional compromise); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First
Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016) (arguing critics overstate the
novelty of using the first amendment for libertarian purposes and underestimate the
difficulty of disentangling judicial tendencies to do so).
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had become interested in using the First Amendment’s free
speech clause to protect labor protest.30 As business and labor
coalesced around their shared interest in a libertarian and antiregulatory rights regime, the Bill of Rights became shared ground.
Perhaps it’s from this, as much as from Roosevelt’s invocation of
the Bill of Rights, that the document began to take a larger place
in the American imagination and popular discourse.
This addition to the narrative would perhaps lessen the
punch of one of Magliocca’s arguments, namely, that the
libertarian use of the Bill of Rights is contingent and relatively
recent. A modest version of this argument is persuasive:
Magliocca has amply documented the fact that the Bill of Rights
were used for other purposes and read in other ways in the past.
Magliocca, to his credit, doesn’t claim more than this. But readers
might be inclined to see in the book a more lopsided story, in
which the libertarian turn really is an innovation from the middle
of the twentieth century. That would be a mistake.
In any case, Magliocca’s next point is certainly right: the
libertarian reading was reiterated through the Cold War. Though
some worried that the protections of the Bill of Rights might
handicap American efforts to defend itself against Communism,
others took the opposite perspective. Many cited the Bill of
Rights as protecting the United States from “‘Communist
tyranny’” (as the 1960 Democratic Party platform put it) (p. 139).
And the American “rights talk” had international reverberations;
Magliocca notes that the Bill of Rights also influenced the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the very outset of the
Cold War era. By the end of the Cold War, the Bill of Rights had
a cultural resonance, even a mythology, built around them. It felt
to Americans as though it had deep historical roots. But this is
because memories of a different era are short. Magliocca has
made it clear how much change the “Bill of Rights” has
undergone as a concept in the American imagination.
V. BILL OF RIGHTS AS PHRASE?
The Heart of the Constitution is a significant contribution to
the history of the Bill of Rights. It’s not entirely a new observation
that the Bill of Rights was an afterthought and did not have much

30. See id.

07 WEINBERGER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

BOOK REVIEWS

12/23/2019 10:24 AM

533

practical, observable effects for many years.31 But Magliocca has
provided the most thorough treatment of this history to date as it
relates to American political and legal discourse. And he has done
so in an accessible form. That’s no mean feat and in itself makes
this a valuable work. Magliocca’s second argument, that the Bill
of Rights has a longer and richer history of facilitating robust
government action, is again not an entirely new observation.32
Various historical actors covered in the book made this
observation, from the antifederalists (who predicted it with their
“tub to the whale” analogy) to Justice Jackson (who endorsed it,
as we have seen). Again, Magliocca has greatly enriched our
understanding by demonstrating how often the Bill of Rights was
used to facilitate power throughout its history.
But many questions are left unanswered. Not all of them are
of equal importance. There are points where answering some
questions about methodology might have helped clarify the
strength of his arguments. At other places, the unanswered
questions are really just a wish list of research topics for future
work. There is only so much one can do in a short volume like this,
so it should not detract from the book’s accomplishment to say
that this book leaves many interesting questions unanswered,
even as it has helpfully opened up lines of inquiry that should lead
to further historical study and analysis.
A. CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY
The Heart of the Constitution is really a history of three
things: first, a text proposed by Congress and enacted as a set of
amendments to the Constitution; second, a concept that gradually
became associated with the document; third, a phrase (“Bill of
Rights”) that was associated with the document and the concept,
but not consistently. But Magliocca doesn’t separate these out and
treat them distinctly. Much (not all) of the book is spent on the
third subject, simply tracking the phrase across American history
(and mostly in statements by legal and government actors) and
examining when it does and doesn’t mean what we today think it

31. See, e.g., Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amendments Became the Bill of
Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 n.a1 (2017); Lael Daniel Weinberger,
Enforcing the Bill of Rights in the United States, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY 93 (Suri
Ratnapala & Gabriël A. Moens, eds. 2011).
32. Magliocca previously presented this argument: see Gerard N. Magliocca, The Bill
of Rights as a Term of Art, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (2016).
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does. Through this history of the phrase, Magliocca also seeks to
tell a story about the other two subjects, the document and the
concept. On the whole, he does quite well in getting the maximum
mileage out of this material. Changes in the use and frequency of
the phrase can shed light on changes in the understanding of the
text and of the conceptual object that we think about when we say
“bill of rights.” He’s sensitive to the subtly different uses made of
the same words in different places and times. All of this is good as
far as it goes—but it isn’t so very far. Tracking particular language
across time can be enlightening but really is just a starting point.
Even the most thorough tracing of a phrase leaves a lot out that
we might care about when we want to understand the history of
the text and the concept.33
A bit more explanation about Magliocca’s method would
have been helpful. First, to the extent that the focus is on tracing
a particular phrase, it would be nice to know how Magliocca found
the references that he discusses: keyword searches, presumably,
formed an important part. But for what terms? Across what
databases? And what, if anything, did he rely on besides keyword
searches to turn up relevant materials? This is what Michael
Douma did in an article on the changing usage of “Bill of Rights”34
(which Magliocca cites). If much of Magliocca’s work is really
driven by word searches across databases, it would be nice to
know more about the limits of the enterprise. And from there I
have a wish-list of additional data that I would suspect he could
have easily provided. For instance, Magliocca could have offered
some basic quantitative information: if he can isolate a number of
recurring alternative names for the Bill of Rights, could we get
counts of how often particular usages turned up across time, or
relative to each other? Does it matter what genre Magliocca is
examining? (He focuses primarily on statements by courts and
government actors. He doesn’t spend much time discussing other
cultural reference points—school textbooks, for instance.35) More
information here would have made it possible to evaluate
33. For analysis of the relationship between terminology and concept, and an
argument about how to use the former to write a history of the latter, see PETER DE BOLLA,
THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONCEPTS: THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2013). For critical analysis of de Bolla’s approach, see Michael Gavin, Intellectual History
and the Computational Turn, 58 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 249 (2017).
34. See Douma, supra note 31, at 598.
35. Douma has argued that textbooks were a key site for defining and developing the
idea of the Bill of Rights. See Douma, supra note 31, at 608–11.
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Magliocca’s comparative assessments of how often people
referred to the text by one name or another. As it is, it is hard to
know how often people talked about the first ten amendments to
the Constitution by other names relative to later references to the
“Bill of Rights.”
The book is short and is written so as to be accessible to a
broad audience. Its confident narrative voice does this effectively.
But it also tends to push these methodological issues out of the
text. It certainly seems like a plausible judgement that lay readers
would rather read a story with clear narrative lines than see a
chart with numbers of occurrences of words or terms. But
academic readers are poorer for this choice, understandable
though it may be.
B. NEXT STEPS FOR THE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
While Magliocca has provided a rich account, there’s plenty
to be done to develop a better understanding of the Bill of Rights
history. Future work would do well to scrutinize about what’s
going on with the “Bill of Rights” as text and concept even when
the label isn’t present. It is not as though Magliocca’s book ignores
the Bill of Rights when it isn’t labeled as such. The book talks
about the alternative labels offered for the text as a whole. But
there is little treatment of an even bigger issue: how did individual
amendments (within the ten that make up the Bill of Rights)
change over time, and how did their trajectories affect the history
of the Bill of Rights as a whole? This is an enormous subject and
it’s understandable that it needs to be cabined to keep this book
to a manageable length. But it’s worth considering what kinds of
questions, and possibilities, this introduces. And it’s worth
wondering if one can actually tell a complete story about the Bill
of Rights as a whole without telling a lot of individual stories
about specific rights.
Start with the simple methodological move that’s at the heart
of the book as it stands—tracing particular language across time.
Some of this language appears in court cases. But courts don’t
deal in abstract principles but in concrete disputes between
parties suing each other. Courts don’t apply “the bill of rights” as
a whole. They apply particular provisions to the case in front of
them. The courts of course aren’t operating in a vacuum. Judges’
ideas about the structure of government, legal interpretation, and
the place of particular constitutional amendments in the broader
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whole of the Constitution all affect their reasoning in individual
cases. But the point is that courts will deal with individual
provisions of a particular amendment often without having any
occasion to reflect on the larger functions of the Bill of Rights. It’s
then hard for me to imagine that the kinds of decisions they make
with individual provisions don’t affect the judge’s broader
interpretation of Bill of Rights as whole.
The effects of individual provisions on broader views of the
Bill of Rights isn’t just a matter for the courts. The legal issues
that arise relating to the Bill of Rights also might matter for
putting the issue in the public eye. For instance, maybe it matters
that the Fifth Amendment, with its mix of criminal procedure
issues and takings issues, was more likely to bring the Bill of
Rights into the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century, while
the First Amendment only became a serious issue in the Supreme
Court in the mid-twentieth century.36 One might think that the
Bill of Rights might be more interesting and meaningful to a
broader swath of Americans when those Americans could
imagine themselves benefitting from its protection. And maybe a
wider swath of Americans could imagine themselves claiming the
benefits of the free speech clause than could imagine themselves
in run-ins with law enforcement or with eminent domain. Maybe
the property-protecting cases were so embroiled in the political
controversies of the Progressive era that it was impossible to
imagine a bipartisan constituency rallying around these issues as
part of a quintessentially American Bill of Rights. It’s easy to
hypothesize possible variations on the relationship. In any case, it
certainly seems likely that the kinds of cases that were brought
mattered in terms of who thought about, and what attitudes
people would form toward, the Bill of Rights. And to the extent
they matter, they at least complicate the story that Magliocca tells,
in which he looks almost exclusively at the ways that the Bill of
Rights as a whole were invoked.
One could take this a step further. Perhaps the cultural and
intellectual history of the Bill of Rights requires considering

36. For a rough comparison, the Supreme Court Database (1791–1945) lists only
twelve cases involving the First Amendment before 1921. See generally HAROLD SPAETH
SUPREME
COURT
DATABASE
CODE
BOOK
(2017),
ET
AL.,
http://supremecourtdatabase.org (searching LG04-TREEHOUSE-2438). By contrast, it
lists 126 cases involving the Fifth Amendment in that same period. Id. (searching LG04BIRDDOG-6670).

07 WEINBERGER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

BOOK REVIEWS

12/23/2019 10:24 AM

537

“rights talk” beyond even the direct content of the Bill of Rights.
To take an episode that Magliocca mentions but doesn’t reflect
on at much length: the popularity and cultural cache of the Bill of
Rights during World War II is tied to the “four freedoms,” and
vice versa. Two of the four freedoms are derivative of the Bill of
Rights. Magliocca briefly discusses the Four Freedoms, but
suggests that they are less informative about attitudes toward the
Bill of Rights, precisely because half of the content is not from the
Constitution. But maybe the relationship is still more
complicated. Maybe Americans became more excited about the
Bill of Rights when they paid less attention to what was in the Bill
of Rights and more to the general idea of freedom for which the
Bill of Rights was just a symbol. The Bill of Rights today is a
potent symbol and yet there’s widespread ignorance of its
contents; one study in 2015 found that about 12% of Americans
thought that the Bill of Rights included a right to own a pet, while
one in four thought that it protects a right to “equal pay for equal
work.”37 A 2019 survey found that 1 in 5 respondents thought that
“the first 10 amendments of the U.S. Constitution are called the
Declaration of Independence instead of the Bill of Rights.”38
Maybe part of the Bill of Rights’ history is a story about public
ignorance of its actual contents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bill of Rights is one of those texts that seems to stand for
principles as old as the nation. The Heart of the Constitution
unsettles this assumption. Gerard Magliocca reminds us that the
Bill of Rights was not always just one thing—indeed, for a while,
it wasn’t a “thing” at all. Its name, its recognition as a single,
thematically-coherent document, its rise to the status of venerated
text were products of history. Magliocca has provided a rich
account of the Bill of Rights’ place in American culture across two
centuries, in this crisp, concise, eminently readable book. One
need not agree with every detail of Magliocca’s account to
37. Is There a Constitutional Right to Own a Home or a Pet?, ANNENBERG PUB.
POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/is-there-aconstitutional-right-to-own-a-home-or-a-pet/; Matthew Shaw, Civic Illiteracy in America,
HARV. POL. REV. (May 25, 2017), https://harvardpolitics.com/culture/civic-illiteracy-inamerica/.
38. ABA Survey of Civic Literacy, A.B.A.: YOURABA (May 2019), https://www.
americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/may-2019/aba-survey-of-civicknowledge-shows-some-confusion-amid-the-awar/.
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recognize that it is a valuable contribution to our understanding
of constitutional history.

